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On January 14th 2009, the ISN published a special report by American strategist and author Thomas P M Barnett on Grand Strategy. I provided the backgrounder attempting a definition of the term:

What is Grand Strategy?

by Ken Egli

While many associate grand strategy with large-scale, long-range planning, specific definitions are hard to come by.

The word strategy stems from the Greek word stratēgos, which denotes a military commander. Although the term has its origins in the battle plans of militaries, it has come to encompass a much broader meaning.

It may be defined as a plan with two major characteristics:

The first gives the planner a competitive advantage over someone else in order to reach a particular goal.

Secondly, the scope of strategy focuses on an extended period of time in which the effects of implementation are not expected to manifest immediately.

These characteristics are also part of grand strategy. But as the term “grand” suggests, there is an additional qualification that needs to be met:

In the context of international relations, this means that grand strategy should also be defined with regards to the geographical scale for which it is established. The term “grand” implies that its focus is larger in scale than that of standard strategizing. This scale can be either regional or global.

Secondly, the actor needs to harness a wide-range of resources in order to reach the intended goal, as the following Encyclopedia Britannica definition suggests:

“Grand strategy encompasses the coordination of all state policy, including economic and diplomatic tools of statecraft, to pursue some national or coalitional ends.”

This definition however, contains a serious shortcoming:

By focusing on the state, empires or coalitions of states, this definition does not provide for the range of actors that may construct a grand strategy; indeed, states are not the only actors capable of designing a grand strategy in the international system.

One can argue that armed non-state actors such as Al- Qaeda or Hezbollah are using a wide variety of resources to attain their goals within the international system. Al- Qaeda, for example, coordinates military and non-military resources, such as its capability to conduct terrorist attacks combined with its dissemination of propaganda, to further its goal of becoming a regional caliphate.. Its writings have also demonstrated a long-term plan to reach this goal, including undermining governments in the West that support moderate Arab governments.

In light of these factors the following definition of grand strategy in the context of international relations might make more sense:

Grand strategy is a long-term plan, by a state or non-state actor, that competes for power in the international system on a global or regional scale that incorporates and coordinates all military and non- military resources to gain an advantage over other actors and reach a defined policy goal.

Whether this definition of grand strategy makes sense is ultimately a question of if one shares some of the assumptions of the neorealist worldview.

Neorealism defines the international system as an anarchical space where the only relevant actors are states competing for power, and where conflict not cooperation is the norm. While this model of the world probably is too state-centric in today’s world of complex interdependence, where many non-state actors – armed or unarmed – have an important influence on developments, it nevertheless reflects the competition for power in the international system and the centrality of security concerns.

Consequence of this core assumption is the necessity for a state or another actor to constantly reassess its standing in the international system and determine how it can safeguard its power from competitors to reach its security and other goals.

While facilitating the competition for power and influence in the international system is undoubtedly a main goal of grand strategy, it should not be reduced to a competition for military power alone. For example, Joseph Nye pointed out in his book Soft Power that while on the level of military power the world is dominated by the US, the distribution of power is much more diffuse in terms of economic power and transnational actors. In other words, military capabilities are not for the only measure of power in the international system.

As a result, grand strategy reflects this multilayered conception of power in the international system by serving as a coordination platform for all the resources an actor must employ to gain its competitive advantage. In today’s globalized world, where an unprecedented empowerment of non-state actors – from NGOs and terrorist groups to a single individual with an internet connection – has taken place, a superpower such as the US needs more than aircraft carriers to reach its intended goals.

If the ‘war on terror’ will ever be won, it is unlikely to be a purely military victory. It might well be the consequence of a combination of different economic, cultural and educational engagements with the Middle East, a negotiated solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and decisive military and covert action to reduce Al-Qaeda’s influence. The long-term coordination of these engagements is the main purpose of a grand strategy.

Ken Egli is an ISN Editor.

This is my newest Security Watch article that has been published on the ISN website.

Comments are very welcome!

28 May 2008

The destruction of sensitive files on two Swiss members of the Khan proliferation network raises questions for Bern and eyebrows over CIA involvement.

Commentary by Ken Egli in Zurich for ISN Security Watch (28/05/08)

On 23 May Pascal Couchepin, a member of the Swiss Federal Council informed the public about the shredding of sensitive materials regarding the involvement of three Swiss citizens in the nuclear proliferation network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb.

Invoking a constitutional article that enables the federal government “to issue ordinances and orders to obviate existing or imminent great disturbances of the public order, the external or the inner security,” the Federal Council justified the destruction of the files by citing the existence therein of technological secrets that could be dangerous if they landed in the wrong hands.

The decision to do so could affect a trial against the three Swiss engineers – a father and his two sons – who may face charges of nuclear technology proliferation.

Swiss technology

According to Swiss media reports, the trio were actively involved in the production and supply of vacuum technology – a key requirement for uranium enrichment – to several countries.

The family’s contact with Khan dates back to the late 1970s when the father’s business first supplied the Pakistani nuclear program with sensitive items. This deal developed into a long-term business relationship.

The sons were also heavily involved in later dealings. One of them, Urs Tinner, was allegedly entrusted by Khan to set up a nuclear weapons production facility in Dubai in order to supply Libya. Tinner is believed to have been part of Khan’s “inner-circle” and oversaw a production facility in Malaysia producing centrifuges intended for the Ghaddafi regime.

Tinner was arrested by German authorities in 2004 and extradited to Switzerland where he has been imprisoned pending charges. His father and brother were also questioned but were later released without charge although the investigation here is also ongoing.

Although it is unclear whether the destruction of the evidence will support the defense’s claim that the Tinner’s were ordinary businessmen caught up in an extraordinary affair, the Federal Council’s decision to destroy evidence related to an ongoing investigation is highly unusual and has raised questions over the CIA’s involvement.

The CIA’s role

Ever since the Khan network was first uncovered, rumors have circulated in the media that Urs Tinner was providing the CIA with inside information which enabled the US to force Libyan President Omar Ghaddafi to abandon his nuclear ambitions.

According to US journalists Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, writing in their book “The Nuclear Jihadist,” the CIA managed to recruit Tinner in a bar in Dubai in early 2000 by capitalizing on legal problems he was facing in France at the time. His information is believed to have been crucial to the CIA’s understanding of the inner workings of the Khan network.

There is evidence to suggest that Tinner was an informant for the CIA. During the 23 May press conference, Couchepin noted that the Federal Council had blocked an investigation against Urs Tinner for “illegal actions for a foreign country” and “illegal intelligence work against a foreign country” six months earlier. It is likely that the material on the Tinners was destroyed not only to prevent the risk of further proliferation, but also to avoid information on the intelligence operation against the Kahn Network reaching the public domain during a trial.

Local media are speculating that the US has put significant pressure on Swiss authorities to avoid such a scenario. The failure to secure a prosecution after three years suggests that Tinner either knows more than he’s letting on – and that his intelligence value remains high – or that he’s secured a deal of sorts.

Trouble ahead?

The Swiss government is likely to face questions over the affair. Some legislators are calling for a parliamentary investigation into the matter, accusing the Federal Council of violating the principle of separation of powers.

However, others believe that the destruction of the documents may well have been a matter of national and international security.

Here are a few pictures and a video showing the US Navy shooting down the rogue spy satellite.

Apparently, they managed to hit it.

I will comment on the political implications of the story and provide some background information on US IMINT capabilities later today…

The Washington Post ran an article last Friday reporting that Al- Qaeda has lost a lot of ground in Iraq due to the eroding support of the local Sunni population for its cause. The Problem seems to be that this cause not only includes an armed resistance against the US presence in the country but also an imposition of a radical, salafist social order on the local communities. Here is an excerpt:

Resting on a blanket in the garden of a squat concrete house in Garma, Ogaidi lamented al-Qaeda in Iraq’s reversal of fortunes over the past year.

 

Ogaidi, 39, once traveled with 20 bodyguards in a four-vehicle convoy. But during the recent interview, he was nearly alone, wearing a white cap on his bald head and a gray dishdasha, or floor-length tunic, to disguise himself as a poor villager.

 

“We made many mistakes over the past year,” including the imposition of a strict interpretation of Islamic law, he told a Washington Post special correspondent. Al-Qaeda in Iraq followers broke the fingers of men who smoked, whipped those who imbibed alcohol and banned shops from selling shampoo bottles that displayed images of women — actions that turned Sunnis against the group.

It looks like that the Iraqis are just not ready to give up some of the simple pleasures in life…

You can find the full article here:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/07/AR2008020703854.html?hpid=sec-world

Definitely worth reading!